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For poor rural families in developing countries, access to 
credit and savings facilities has the potential to make the 
difference between grinding poverty and an economically 
secure life. Well-managed savings facilities permit house-
holds to build up funds for future investment or con-
sumption. Credit enables them to tap finances beyond 
their own resources and to take advantage of profitable 
investment opportunities. Credit and savings also serve as 
insurance for the poor. In rural areas of developing 
countries, short-term loans or past savings are often used 
to provide basic necessities when household incomes 
decline temporarily—after a bad harvest or between agri-
cultural seasons, for example. 
 But in most developing countries, rural financial 
services are sadly inadequate. Those who want to borrow 
from the formal sector are usually deterred by the strict 
collateral requirements and high transaction costs in-
volved in doing business with formal institutions. Many 
potential borrowers are in such need of credit that they are 
willing to pay substantially higher interest rates in the 
informal markets—sometimes as high as 80 percent per 
year. But the amount of credit available through informal 
markets is often constrained by bottlenecks in the local 
supply of funds.  
 The story on the savings side is similar. Costs involved 
in managing small deposits at faraway banks are high, 
discouraging farmers and rural entrepreneurs from mak-
ing a series of tiny deposits, as they prefer to do. Many of 
the rural financial institutions choose not to accept de-
posits; others are legally forbidden to do so to protect 






 As important as rural finances are, the task of providing 
credit and saving opportunities at a reasonable cost to 
those who have only meager assets has been neither 
straightforward nor easy. Until the 1980s, in many de-
veloping countries, state-run agricultural development 
banks—armed with subsidized funds and eloquent pro-
poor directives—took the lead in establishing formal 
credit markets in rural areas. However, the shortcomings 
of the institutional principles they were based on—
collateralized lending, an organizational setup without 
any incentives to do business with the poor, and pervasive 
political patronage—severely handicapped their perfor-
mance. Not only did they fail to serve the poor who could 
not pledge collateral, their inefficiency made them so 
dependent on state subsidies that they became financially 
unsustainable. Since then, support for state-sponsored 
agricultural banks has greatly declined, and the need for 
financial market reforms to rectify distortions caused by 
past policies is almost universally acknowledged.  
 Now, the most basic roles of government—establishing 
macroeconomic stability, ensuring that financial markets 
are free to respond to economic incentives while follow-
ing sound banking practices, and maintaining and 
enforcing a legal framework that ensures contract 
compliance—are beyond dispute. However, these actions 
alone cannot trigger development of rural financial 
institutions that serve the poor. This is because rural 
financial markets have inherent problems that make 
investments risky as well as costly, and formal financial 
institutions have been unable to devise profitable savings 
and loan services for the rural poor. Information about 
potential borrowers, especially in far-flung areas, is 
difficult to obtain, making loan applications excessively 
costly to evaluate, especially when loans are small. The 
poor also own few assets, making it infeasible for the 
financial institution to secure its lending with collateral. 
As a result, private investors either shy away from the 
financial sector or limit their services within the urban 
economy, where information on prospective borrowers is 
less costly to obtain. 
This is not to say that private-sector banks will not have 
a role in the rural financial sector in the future. Many 
countries initiated serious financial reforms only in the 
second half of the 1980s. Therefore, it is too early to con-
clude that private banks, which are just now establishing 
themselves in urban areas, will not gradually expand their 
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services to rural areas as these become more developed 
and prosperous. 
Lenders in informal markets do provide loans to the 
poor. In all these countries, informal lenders make loans 
without collateral, using various techniques for screening 
applicants and enforcing repayment. Households or even 
small communities may enter into mutually beneficial 
risk-pooling schemes; traders disburse credit to farmers in 
exchange for the right to market the growing crop; 
shopkeepers increase sales by providing credit for food, 
farm inputs, and household necessities; and large 
landholders secure access to labor in the peak season in 
return for earlier loan advances to laborers. In many 
countries informal credit and savings associations play an 
important role in the provision of financial services. In 
fact, the ingenuity of informal lenders and self-help 
organizations in tailoring loan products to the require-
ments of their clients or members makes them indis-
pensable in both the urban and rural financial landscape 
of developing countries. 
 But innovative and useful as the informal sector may 
be, it frequently runs up against severe constraints. 
Informal credit markets, by their very nature, are 
segmented. A "market" typically consists of a single 
village community. And informal lenders seldom manage 
savings deposits. Hence, financial intermediation in the 
sense of providing a common clearinghouse for 
borrowers and lenders does not take place to the fullest 
extent possible. As a result, the supply of credit is limited, 
resulting in either severe credit rationing or extremely 
high interest rates for some lenders. Also, especially in 
agricultural regions, risks arising out of droughts or 
floods affect both informal lenders and borrowers 
simultaneously, so a credit supply crunch is likely to take 
place just when the demand for credit peaks. 
 Overall, it is clear that the task of delivering financial 






 Successful financial outreach to the rural poor requires 
institutional innovations that reduce the risks and costs of 
lending small amounts of money. So far, most innova-
tions in microfinance have come from nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) that do not have commercial profit 
as their principal objective. By taking fresh approaches, 
these new microfinance institutions have penetrated rural 
financial markets and serviced an underclass of borrowers 
in a way that was unimaginable some 20 years ago. 
 Far from being one-shot transfers, loans from such 
institutions have helped poor families make permanent 
positive changes in the quality of their lives. Of course, 
lack of capital is only one factor keeping poor rural 
households from improving their welfare. In rural areas of 
developing countries, illiteracy is high, basic social and 
market infrastructure is lacking, and many people are in 
poor health. When seed or irrigation water for the farmer, 
market access for the rural producer, or elementary 
bookkeeping skills for the would-be entrepreneur are 
absent, the returns to financial services will be low or 





 One important lesson that is becoming increasingly 
clear: there is no single institutional blueprint for success. 
Recent experience with institutional innovations has 
shown that programs must be designed to harness a 
community's particular strengths in order to reduce costs 
of screening participants, monitoring financial activity, 
and enforcing contractual obligations. The group-based 
system has worked well in Bangladesh, whereas several 
programs in Indonesia successfully use local agents to 
assess borrowers' creditworthiness. 
 Designing, experimenting with, and building financial 
institutions for the poor require economic resources and 
adequate consideration of longer-term social returns. In 
the last two decades, NGOs have taken the lead partly 
because the support they receive from donors and 
government organizations make it feasible for them to 
invest in innovations. Just as public policy should play a 
role in promoting technological innovations that generate 
social benefits, it should also help promote institutional 
innovations that assist the disadvantaged or address 
intrinsic market failures. As policymakers seek to make 
rational policy choices, they must weigh the social costs 
of designing and building financial institutions for the 
poor against their social benefits. Of course, some 
experiments in institutional innovations will succeed, 
while others will fail. Public policy will need to support 
and evaluate this experimentation process and nurture 
those designs or institutions that hold promise of future 
success. Governments, donors, practitioners, and research 
institutions must work together closely to pinpoint the 
costs, benefits, and future potential of emerging financial 
institutions. 
 In the long run, the payoff to public investment in 
institutional innovations will lie in the transformation of 
now nascent microfinance institutions into full-fledged, 
financial intermediaries that offer savings and credit 
services to smallholders, tenant farmers, and rural 
entrepreneurs, thus alleviating poverty. Evidence of this 
transformation is already emerging in countries such as 
Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Thailand. The payoff will 
also come from the development of viable lending 
methodologies that private commercial banks can readily 
adopt to profitably provide savings and loan services to 
the poor. This is already happening in some parts of the 
world: in urban Latin America, for example, private 
commercial banks have started to adopt group-based 
lending methods developed and tested by nonprofit 
organizations that initially depended on public support. 
With the right combination of public policy, private 
initiative, and objective research, public investments in 
financial institutions designed to serve the poor in other 
rural areas of Africa, Asia, and Latin America will bear 
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